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"It is difficult to find any real distinction between cases in which (1) the trial court
is considering the propriety of setting aside a conviction pursuant to a motion for
coram nobis when the defendant has fully served his sentence and (2) cases in which
an appellate court dismisses an appeal from a conviction because the defendant has
fully served his sentence, especially when questions of constitutional right are involved
in the appeal." 2 9
However, it is not difficult to distinguish those situations from the one involved
in this case, where the sentence remained unsatisfied.
Insofar as the court suggests that persons irregularly released from imprison-
ment do not raise a question of substantial right in a proceeding in the nature of
coram nobis, it is submitted that the case is doubtful authority.
However, in its more important aspect of laying accurate survey lines about an
important procedural remedy in the criminal law at this particular stage of evolu-
tion in contemporary practice, State v. Huffman has undoubtedly made a valuable
and commendable contribution to the criminal common law.
Raymond L. Mushrush
CRIMINAL LAW: HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE-EFFECT OF CONCURIRENTLY
SERVED TERMS
Bill Sukovitzen has had a hard time staying out of trouble. In 1938 he was con-
victed for violation of the Dyer Act' in Nevada. In 1940 he was convicted of for-
gery in San Francisco, for which he was imprisoned but later paroled. While on
parole he was convicted in March, 1943 of robbery in Nevada County. His parole
under the forgery conviction was revoked, and his sentence for the Nevada County
robbery was made to run concurrently with the unexpired portion of the forgery
term. In May, 1943, he was convicted of two robberies in San Francisco (presum-
ably committed while he was on parole from the forgery conviction). The sentences
for these two robberies were made to run consecutively to the forgery term but
concurrently with each other and with that portion of the Nevada County robbery
term which would overlap. In 1944 Sukovitzen was convicted of a robbery in Sac-
ramento (also presumably committed while on parole from the forgery conviction)
for which he was sentenced to a term to run consecutively to all the terms to which
he was then under sentence. Therefore, in 1945 after the forgery term had expired,
Sukovitzen was serving three terms simultaneously: the term for the Nevada
County robbery and those for the two San Francisco robberies. He had to wait
until all of these terms ended before he started on the term for the Sacramento
robbery. He was serving these three terms when he escaped from Folsom Prison in
1954 and committed the robbery for which he was convicted in the present action,
People v. Sukovitzen." After reviewing the defendant's record the trial court ad-
judged him a habitual criminal under California Penal Code section 644 (a), and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On appeal, however, it was held that Sukovitzen could not be adjudged a habit-
ual criminal under Penal Code section 644 (a). That section provides:
Every person convicted in this State of the crime of robbery... who shall have been
previously twice convicted upon charges separately brought and tried, and who shall
2 State v. Huffman, 207 Ore. at ..... 297 P.2d at 851.
141 STAT. 324 (1919), 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2311-2313 (1948) (transportation, sale or receipt
of stolen vehicles in interstate commerce).
2138 Cal. App. 2d 159, 291 P.2d 107 (1955).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
have served separate terms therefor in any State prison . of the crime of robbery,
burglary, burglary with explosives, rape with force or violence, arson, murder, assault
with intent to commit murder, grand theft, bribery of a public official, perjury, sub-
ordination of perjury, train wrecking, feloniously receiving stolen goods, felonious
assault with a deadly weapon, extortion, kidnapping, mayhem, escape from a state
prison, rape or fornication or sodomy or carnal abuse of a child under age of 14 years,
or any act punishable under Section 288 of this code, conspiracy to commit any one or
more of the aforementioned felonies, shall be adjudged a habitual criminal and shall be
punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life. (Emphasis added.)
The court held that to come within the statute as a "prior conviction," the convic-
tion must have been for one of the crimes designated and must have been followed
by a separate previously served term therefor. Since forgery and violation of the
Dyer Act are not among the crimes designated, those convictions do not count.
Neither does the Sacramento robbery conviction, because the term for that con-
viction had not yet started and so was not a previous conviction within the mean-
hag of the statute. Furthermore, and the point being emphasized here, the court
held that the convictions for the two San Francisco robberies could not be counted
either, since no part of the terms for these convictions was separately served, be-
cause from their commencement in 1945 they were served concurrently with the
Nevada County robbery term. This interpretation left only part of one term sep-
arately served, that portion of the Nevada County robbery term from 1943, when
it commenced, until 1945, when the two San Francisco robbery terms started run-
ning concurrently with it. Service of part of a term satisfies the requirement of the
statute,5 and therefore the court held that the defendant had served one prior con-
viction within the meaning of the statute.
A holding that concurrently served terms do not satisfy the separate service
required by California's Habitual Criminal Statute, California Penal Code section
644, is not new.4 But this writer questions the advisability of applying this rule to
the facts of the Sukovitzen case. Should a defendant with a past record of convic-
tions for violation of the Dyer Act in 1938, forgery in 1940, robbery in March of
1943, two robberies in May of 1943, and a robbery in 1944 who is subsequently
convicted of robbery after escaping from prison in 1954 avoid the rigors of the
Habitual Criminal Statute because the trial court in sentencing for the two May
1943 robberies made the sentences run concurrently with the term of the March
1943 robbery? To answer this question we must first answer another: Why exclude
convictions followed by concurrently served terms from the operation of the
Habitual Criminal Statute?
The basis for California decisions holding that convictions followed by con-
currently served terms are not to count for the purpose of imposing a greater pen-
alty under the Habitual Criminal Statute lies in the 1935 amendment 5 to that
statute. Before this amendment, the statute required that for a prior conviction to
be counted, it was merely necessary for the defendant to have "served a term
therefor,"O and the courts had held this requirement satisfied when there had been
service on concurrently served terms.7 The 1935 amendment made the provision
that for prior convictions to be counted the defendant must have "served separate
a People v. Mangan, 87 Cal. App. 2d 765, 197 P.2d 781, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 920 (1948).
4 Spivey v. McGilvray, 29 Cal. App. 2d 357, 84 P.2d 256 (1938); People v. Gump, 17 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 61 P.2d 970 (1936).
5 CALiF. STATS. 1935, p. 1699.
6 CAr.=r. STATS. 1931, p. 1052.
7 Spivey v. McGilvray, 29 Cal. App. 2d 357, 84 P.2d 256 (1938).
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terms therefor."8 (Emphasis added.) The firstappellate case dealing with this
additional "separate" requirement understood it to mean that the legislature
wished to halt findings of habitual criminality based on convictions followed by
service of concurrent terms.9 And thus it has remained.
In many cases such an interpretation is wise and supported by sound reason.
This is apparent when one considers the effect of imposing concurrent sentences
and the implications arising from such imposition.
At common law when a defendant was convicted of more than one crime, it was
within the court's discretionary power to impose either cumulative or concurrent
sentences.' 0 Sentences which are served concurrently are served during the same
period of time, for their full duration or for only part. Sentences which are served
cumulatively are served consecutively and on termination of a prior sentence, the
subsequent sentence commences immediately.
The common law rule is largely embodied in California Penal Code section
669, which provides that when a person is convicted of two or more crimes, whether
in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and whether
by judgment rendered by the same or different judges, the later judgment must
direct whether the terms of imprisonment are to run consecutively or concurrently.
The section leaves a great amount of discretionary power in the trial court, how-
ever, as to when concurrent and consecutive sentences are to be imposed.'
It will be seen on a moment's reflection that by allowing sentences to run con-
currently, a trial judge may grant leniency to an offender whom he feels is deserv-
ing. In such a case, two or more terms may be served simultaneously, and the effect
of the subsequent sentence is thereby either partially or totally alleviated. On the
other hand, should the trial judge so decide, he might provide a more severe pun-
ishment for the offender by having his sentences run consecutively, thereby giving
each term its maximum effect.12 The trial judge may take into consideration the
circumstances of the case and the character of the defendant, 13 and render judg-
ment accordingly. 14
There would appear, then, to be a very good reason for excluding convictions
followed by concurrently served terms from the operation of our Habitual Crim-
inal Statute. It has been repeatedly stated that the Habitual Criminal Statute is
aimed at the so-called recivitist, the habitual offender who indicates such a ten
dency toward the repetition of criminal acts that he may never be reformed. 15 Its
function, therefore, is to act as a deterrent to repeated criminal acts16 and as a
protection for society from those who have become habitual criminals. 17 One
charged with being a habitual criminal should have had the opportunity to reform
by giving him the chance to consider the errors of his ways during each separate
8 CALIF. STATS. 1935, p. 1699.
9 Spivey v. McGilvray, 29 Cal. App. 2d 357, 84 P.2d 256 (1938).
10 14 CAL. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 275 (1954).
"1 People v. Tipton, 124 Cal. App. 2d 213, 268 P.2d 196 (1954) ; People v. Palacio, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 778, 195 P.2d 439 (1948).
12People v. White, 100 Cal. App. 2d 836, 224 P.2d 868 (1950).
13 People v. VanValkenburg, 111 Cal. App. 2d 337, 244 P.2d 750 (1952).
14 People v. Withers, 73 Cal. App. 2d 58, 165 P.2d 945 (1946).
15 People v. Richardson, 74 Cal. App. 2d 528, 169 P.2d 44 (1946).
16 24 CAL. JuR. 2d Habitual Criminals § 2 (1955).
17 People v. Coleman, 145 Cal. 609, 79 Pac. 283 (1904) ; People v. Stone, 69 Cal. App. 2d
533, 159 P.2d 701 (1945).
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term for each conviction relied on to place him in that status.18 It is his failure to
reform that causes him to be labelled an incorrigible,' 9 and by relying on convic-
tions followed by sentences served simultaneously with sentences for other offenses
we are denying the defendant that opportunity to reform.
The California courts recognize an exception to the rule excluding concurrently
served terms from the operation of the statute. This exception arises in situations
where a portion of two or more sentences is served concurrently and is illustrated
in the case of People v. Mangan.20 In that case the appellant, while on parole from
a former conviction, committed a second offense for which he was convicted and
sentenced to a term to be served concurrently with the unserved remainder of the
former sentence. He was discharged from the first sentence 12 days after the sec-
ond sentence began. The court held that since service of a term within the mean-
ing of California Penal Code section 644 includes part of a term as well as a full
term,2 ' the mere fact that a portion of the two sentences was served concurrently
did not prevent them from being separate within the meaning of the statute. This
was the basis for the court's holding in the Sukovitzen case that the defendant's
service of the Nevada County term from 1943 to 1945 could be regarded as a
separately served term.
There is a sound basis, however, for liberalizing the rule which excludes con-
victions followed by concurrently served terms beyond the specific exception rec-
ognized by the courts and which is mentioned above. The principal case is particu-
larly in point. Here the defendant, during a 16 year period, has suffered seven
convictions, five of which are for crimes specifically covered by the Habitual Crim-
inal Statute. He has demonstrated his inability to reform and his peril to society,
the very evils with which the statute attempts to deal. However, the defendant is
able to evade that statute, curiously enough, because of the leniency afforded him
when three of his sentences were made to run concurrently, but which leniency he
has spurned. The motivation of mercy which causes a trial judge to impose the
more lenient punishment is admirable. But it should not be defeated by the very
thing it is intended to prevent, namely, a return to crime. The comment of Shake-
speare's Senator that "Nothing emboldens sin so much as mercy" 22 may at first
blush appear cynical, but it suggests the unrepentant criminal who cannot learn his
lesson without suffering physical punishment for each crime. It is suggested that
the unrepentant criminal, the criminal who has spurned leniency, comes particu-
larly within the class of offenders with which the Habitual Criminal Statute deals.
Yet through the application of the rule excluding convictions followed by concur-
rently served terms the courts allow this undeserving criminal to escape the pun-
ishment particularly applicable to him.
The answer to this problem does not lie in abolishing the rule excluding these
convictions. While it might be said that any criminal who commits a crime after
having served concurrent terms for past crimes is to some extent "spurning" len-
iency, the matter is one of degree. The need is for a more flexible rule.
Therefore, it is suggested that the problem could be met by allowing the trial
court discretion to determine whether concurrently served terms will count under
the Habitual Criminal Statute in a particular case. Such discretion would be based
1 8 See State v. Miles, 24 Wash. 2d 55, 207 P.2d 1209 (1949).
19 UNDERnMM, CR aUNA EVIDENCE 1080 (3d ed. 1923).
2087 Cal. App. 2d 765, 197 P.2d 781, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 920 (1948).
21People v. Martin, 78 Cal. App. 2d 340, 177 P.2d 813 (1947).2 2 SIAKESPEA, TIMON or AT=Ns, Act I, Sc. 5.
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upon its opinion whether or not a defendant has in any way profited from the past
leniency afforded him by the imposition of the concurrent sentences. This is the
same type of discretion exercised by the court in imposing concurrent or cumula-
tive sentences. Lacking judicial precedent, however, such a provision would have
to be embodied in the statute.
Whether a particular criminal was in fact deserving of a former court's leniency
through its imposition of concurrent sentences could be determined in retrospect
by considering such clear cut matters as: (1) The number of subsequent convic-
tions (including those not specifically within Penal Code section 644); (2) The
nature of the crimes for which the defendant was convicted; (3) The similarity
in nature between these crimes (specifically, such similarities as assault bears to
robbery or which fraud bears to forgery, which tend to manifest a continued pro-
pensity toward a particular type of crime); and (4) The period of time during
which the commission of these crimes took place (if the crimes took place over a
longer period of time it would tend to indicate a more persistent tendency to com-
mit crimes, whereas commissions during a shorter span would tend to indicate a
more shortlived criminal spree.) It should be emphasized that this would not be an
attempt to review the prior trial court's judgment in imposing the concurrent serv-
ice, but to determine whether in fact the defendant has profited from the leniency
shown him or whether his subsequent conduct merely manifests contempt for this
leniency or total disregard of it.
There may be another factor for the court to consider. It is possible that the
trial court which imposed the concurrent sentences had no other choice than to
impose them as it did. For example, in the present case at the time the concurrent
sentences were imposed, the defendant was already under sentence for the Ne-
vada County robbery, and any sentence imposed during the term of this earlier
sentence would, of needs, have to run at least in part concurrently with it. The
only other alternative would have been to have the terms for these robberies run
consecutively with the Nevada County robbery term.23 But even then these con-
victions could not be counted in the present case. For when the defendant escaped
from the penitentiary in 1954, he was still serving for the Nevada County robbery,
and, since it had not yet terminated, sentences running consecutively to it could
not have commenced. Since the term for the convictions would not yet have
started, they could not be counted as previous convictions within the meaning of
the statute. This is the same argument preventing the Sacramento robbery convic-
tion from coming within the operation of the statute.
If a defendant has manifested an incorrigible criminal disposition, he should
not be allowed to evade the Habitual Criminal Statute because a former trial court
was unable to impose a sentence giving the maximum effect to its judgment. Such a
factor would strongly suggest that such concurrent sentences should not operate
in the defendant's favor, but should be counted.
The rule providing for exercise of the trial court's discretion in determining
when concurrently served terms are to count under the Habitual Criminal Statute
based on the factors suggested above would be easily administered. The necessary
facts required for its determination are available from the report required of the
prosecution when invocation of the statute is requested.2
4
It is felt that by including certain convictions followed by concurrently served
23 In re Whitton, 120 Cal. App. 2d 608, 261 P.2d 775 (1953).
2 CALIF. PEN. CODE § 969.
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